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173 
 
Susan A. Mort* 
Contracting Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their 
legal systems, the measures necessary to ensure the application of 
this Treaty. 
—WIPO Copyright Treaty1 
[A]nd to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellec-
tual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legiti-
mate trade. 
—TRIPs Agreement2 
The Internet is based on open standards . . . . 
—James Barksdale, Netscape3 
 
* Attorney, Fleischman and Walsh, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.  Cornell University, 
B.A. 1993; Syracuse University School of Law, J.D. 1996; Georgetown University Law 
Center, LL.M. 1998.  The author wishes to thank Don Wallace, Jr., Terence P. Stewart, 
and Donald R. Dinan for their sage advice; Myles Getlan and Won-Kyong Kim for their 
helpful comments; Daniel B. Pickard for his support; and her family for everything.  The 
opinions expressed in this Article are the author’s own and do not implicitly or explicitly 
reflect the views of Fleischman and Walsh L.L.P. or its clients. 
1. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art. 14(1), adopted 
by Diplomatic Conference at Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter 
WIPO Copyright Treaty] (outlining provisions for protection of literary and artistic 
works in light of new technology). 
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, pmbl., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
3. James Barksdale, president and CEO of Netscape, quoted in Joshua Cooper 
Ramo, Winner Take All, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 63. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International intellectual property law is racing to catch up 
with technology on the Internet.  The goal:  to make the Internet a 
reliable conduit for global commerce—a conduit with the potential 
to handle international trade of staggering proportions. 
Throughout the twentieth century, numerous technological ad-
vances have created unprecedented opportunities for economic 
prosperity.  A necessary result of this progress has been the burden 
of adapting legal systems to maintain firm standards while foster-
ing financial growth.  One clear example of this phenomenon in-
volves the formation of new intellectual property rules aimed at the 
transmission of protected materials over the Internet. 
In December 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (“WIPO”)4 convened more than 160 delegations in order to 
conclude new agreements covering the protection of copyright and 
neighboring rights in digital environments.5  The resulting two 
treaties6 contain broad provisions designed to apply to a variety of 
situations involving information technologies, including digital re-
cordings, satellite broadcasts, and Internet transmissions.7  The 
importance of these agreements derives not only from their intel-
lectual property principles, but also from their effect upon interna-
tional trade. 
Commerce over the Internet has the potential to exceed billions 
 
4. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), 
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1770, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO Treaty].  WIPO is a 
specialized United Nations agency established in 1970 with the goal of “promoting re-
spect for, and the protection of, intellectual property throughout the world.”  PAUL 
MARETT, MARETT:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 230 (1996). 
5. See WIPO Press Release No. 105 (visited Dec. 28, 1997) 
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/press105.htm>. 
6. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1; World Intellectual Property Organization 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted by Diplomatic Conference at Geneva, 
Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter Phonogram Treaty] (detailing protection of per-
formers, producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations in light of technologi-
cal advancements). 
7. See WIPO Press Release No. 106 (visited Dec. 28, 1997) 
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/press106.htm>. 
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of dollars by the turn of the century.8  This growth will, to a large 
degree, depend upon the reliability of legal norms developed to 
control the Internet’s content.  For example, the participation of in-
tellectual property holders in an electronic marketplace will be 
predicated upon whether their interests are sufficiently secure from 
piracy.  In this way, these new Internet Treaties (“Internet Trea-
ties”)9 can play a significant role in developing the future shape of 
international trade.10 
Apart from the substantive provisions of these Internet Trea-
ties, the actual negotiations provide a useful context for examining 
the institutional relationship between the World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”)11 and WIPO.  At the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round,12 the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”)13 established a symbiotic 
arrangement, whereby the WTO incorporated by reference certain 
international conventions administered by WIPO and made them 
subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures.14  The goal of 
 
8. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Will Urge Other Countries to Take “Hands Off” Ap-
proach to Trade Over Internet, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 111 (Jan. 22, 1997). 
9. The phrase “Internet Treaties” is not an entirely accurate description of the two 
WIPO treaties concluded in December 1996.  These documents apply to a very broad 
scope of digital technologies, many, but not all, of which bear upon the Internet.  Be-
cause the agreements both address the legal gaps engendered by the Internet and recog-
nize its burgeoning role in international trade, the author finds it appropriate to employ 
“Internet Treaties” as a shorthand. 
10. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, pmbl. (discussing the need for ade-
quate solutions to questions raised by new technological developments). 
11. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was created as part of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) revision signed April 15, 1994.  Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (“Uru-
guay Round”), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].  The WTO 
administers a system to settle disputes and institute sanctions against noncompliant coun-
tries.  See MARETT, supra note 4, at 234-37. 
12. The Uruguay Round consisted of a series of negotiations between 1986 and 
1993, which resulted in the revision of the GATT.  See MARETT, supra note 4, at 235.  
The revision was signed by 125 countries on April 15, 1994.  See Final Act, supra note 
11. 
13. As part of the 1994 revision of the GATT, the TRIPs Agreement established the 
WTO and created an enforcement mechanism to insure that international intellectual 
property treaties are upheld.  TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2; see MARETT, supra note 4, 
at 236-39. 
14. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl. 
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this endeavor was to strengthen international protection of intellec-
tual property by providing it with an effective and forceful dispute 
resolution system.15 
For its part, WIPO retained its leadership role in creating sub-
stantive intellectual property law.  The conclusion of the Internet 
Treaties presents the WTO and WIPO with a challenge to this 
newly-formed cooperation.  The ability of these institutions to suc-
cessfully adapt intellectual property law to the changing techno-
logical times will prove crucial, not only to the future of the TRIPs 
Agreement, but also to the development of electronic and digital 
commerce. 
This Article identifies the Internet Treaties as a crucial turning 
point in the evolution of intellectual property protection in the 
electronic marketplace.  Part I provides an historical overview of 
international intellectual property law, beginning with the first in-
ternational conventions during the late nineteenth century, continu-
ing through the creation of WIPO in 1967, and concluding with the 
integration of intellectual property protection into the WTO 
through the TRIPs Agreement.  Part II outlines the issues and iden-
tifies the players involved in the negotiation of the new Internet 
Treaties in Geneva during December 1996.  Part III considers the 
problems and promise associated with the Internet Treaties, con-
centrating on (1) the pitfalls of drafting the United States imple-
menting legislation, (2) the basic structure and provisions of the 
Internet Treaties, and (3) their potential place in the bifurcated 
WTO-WIPO intellectual property system.  Despite the Internet 
Treaties’ potentially debilitating problems, this Article concludes 
that the treaties mark an important first step on the road to securing 
intellectual property protection over the information superhigh-
way. 
I. WTO AND WIPO 
Intellectual property conventions, which were originally en-
acted independently to establish international protection standards, 
have been consolidated under the auspices of WIPO.  In turn, the 
TRIPs Agreement has formed a WTO-WIPO marriage by integrat-
 
15. See MARETT, supra note 4, at 236-39. 
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ing much of WIPO’s substantive law into the WTO’s trade regime.  
The TRIPs Agreement also contains other major innovations, in-
cluding its enforcement provisions and its use of the WTO’s Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“Dispute 
Settlement Understanding”).16 
A. WIPO and its Conventions 
Since the late nineteenth century, international conventions 
have governed the protection of intellectual property passing be-
tween states.17  These conventions provide only the minimum 
standards of protection guaranteed in the international arena.  Indi-
vidual countries can, and often do, provide for higher levels of pro-
tection within their borders.  The contracting parties simply agree 
to follow the principle of national treatment, thereby providing the 
same level of protection for nationals of other member states as 
they do for their own citizens.18  The logic behind this approach 
lies in the fact that wide disparities existed among the various na-
tional standards that predated the conventions.  Thus, these treaties 
represent the most basic level of protection which all members 
could agree to respect. 
Until WIPO’s creation in 1967, these conventions operated in-
dependently and without any institutional oversight.  A necessary 
consequence of this independence was that, in order to enforce 
their convention-based rights, intellectual property holders had to 
seek redress in the national court system of a contracting party.  
Despite these difficulties, membership in international conventions 
 
16. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
17. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, 
completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on 
June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
18. The principle of national treatment requires that parties to an agreement extend 
the same protection to foreign nationals, from member nations, as they do domestic na-
tionals.  See INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW 16 (Wilhelm 
Nordemann et al. eds. & Gerald Meyer trans., 1990). 
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grew steadily throughout the twentieth century, in large part due to 
the reciprocal benefits gained through participation.19 
Today, nineteen such treaties exist,20 ranging in subject matter 
from industrial property to satellite transmissions.21  For example, 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (“Berne Convention”)22 was completed in 1886 to set mini-
mum standards of copyright protection between its members.23  
Presently, the Berne Convention has 127 members, approximately 
thirty of which have joined since 1992.24  The Rome Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations (“Rome Convention”)25 was con-
cluded in 1961 and has grown to include fifty-five parties.26  The 
other major intellectual property unions, including the Paris Con-
vention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Conven-
tion”)27 and the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Trademarks (“Madrid Agreement”),28 also have 
endured for more than a century. 
The United Nations created WIPO in 1967 as a specialized 
 
19. See Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by WIPO (visited Dec. 28, 
1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific> (listing parties and dates of ratification). 
20. See Texts of Treaties Administered by WIPO (visited Dec. 28, 1997) 
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/iplex/index.htm> (listing treaties). 
21. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., INTERNATIONAL TRADE:  STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 23 (1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
22. Berne Convention, supra note 17. 
23. See id. 
24. A current listing of Berne Convention members can be found at WIPO’s Inter-
net website.  See Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by WIPO, Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (visited Dec. 29, 1997) 
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/e-berne.htm>. 
25. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organisations, done at Rome, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 
[hereinafter Rome Convention]. 
26. A current listing of signatories to the Rome Convention can be found at WIPO’s 
Internet website.  See Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by WIPO, Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organisations (visited Dec. 29, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/k-
rome.htm>. 
27. Paris Convention, supra note 17. 
28. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 
1891, last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid 
Agreement]. 
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agency designed to promote the protection of intellectual property 
worldwide and to administer the major international conventions 
under the leadership of the United Nations Director General and 
Secretariat.29  The Secretariat not only performs administrative 
functions, but also provides advisory and educational services for 
developing countries.30  All 166 members of WIPO send delegates 
to the organization’s General Assembly in Geneva for the purpose 
of conducting conferences, negotiating revisions to the conven-
tions, and providing a multilateral forum for discussion.31  Never-
theless, for more than two decades, while serving as the sole inter-
national authority charged with oversight of these conventions, 
WIPO has failed to correct the key deficiency present in the con-
ventions:  the inability to enforce rights and resolve conflicts 
through formal dispute resolution procedures.32 
B. Integration Into a Trade Regime 
In 1986, the United States and other countries began promoting 
the integration of intellectual property protection into the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)33 as a part of the Uru-
guay Round negotiations.34  The United States was tired of the 
weak levels of protection under the WIPO conventions and main-
tained that stronger enforcement and dispute settlement procedures 
were necessary in order to eliminate the piracy of intellectual 
property.35  Developing countries had continually hampered prior 
 
29. See Monique Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
121, 122 (1994). 
30. See GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 24. 
31. As of December 10, 1997, 166 countries had joined the Convention Establish-
ing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  See Contracting Parties of Treaties 
Administered by WIPO (visited Dec. 29, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/c-
wipo.htm>. 
32. See Cordray, supra note 29, at 131-33. 
33. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
34. See Hanns Ullrich, GATT:   Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and De-
velopment, in GATT OR WIPO?  NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 127 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds. 1989); see 
also GAO REPORT, supra note 21. 
35. See GAO REPORT, supra note 21; see also Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPs and 
the Future of Section 301:   A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 175-77 (1995). 
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efforts at raising standards, while jurisdictional difficulties pre-
vented the reference of disputes to the International Court of Jus-
tice, as provided for under the Berne and Paris Conventions.36  
Commentators asserted that the “WIPO dispute settlement [was] 
‘effectively worthless.’”37 
The United States and others hoped to change that trend by 
creating a trade-based sanction regime for noncompliance.38  The 
United States, the European Community, and Switzerland each 
supported the establishment of a TRIPs Committee and an Expert 
Group of advisors, partially composed of WIPO representatives 
operating under the dispute settlement procedures of the General 
Assembly.39  In contrast, the developing countries favored a more 
fluid and negotiative approach relying heavily on consultation.40  
At the end of the day, the more legalistic stance prevailed, making 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding applicable to complaints 
under the TRIPs Agreement.41 
That initiative, however, did not intend to eliminate WIPO’s 
authority and expertise in matters relating to intellectual property 
standards.42  The United States considered that “while GATT may 
be competent to consider the trade aspects of piracy, WIPO is a 
more appropriate forum for debate on any intellectual property is-
sue.”43  Thus, from the Western perspective, the integration of in-
tellectual property protection into a trade-based sanction regime 
was meant to create a symbiotic institutional relationship between 
the WTO and WIPO. 
Although that integration was supported by many of the devel-
oped countries, detractors pointed out the problems and difficulties 
 
36. See GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 25; Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 
33; Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 28. 
37. Cordray, supra note 29, at 131 (quoting Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in 
the Uruguay Round—Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1317, 1343 (1990)). 
38. See GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 35-37; Getlan, supra note 35, at 175-78. 
39. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:  A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2310-
13 (Terence P. Stewart ed., Kluwer 1993) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING HISTORY]. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. at 2247-48; GAO REPORT, supra note 21. 
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 21, at 37. 
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involved.  Some commentators argued that the TRIPs Agreement 
negotiations would suffer from a lack of input from intellectual 
property specialists like those at WIPO’s Secretariat.44  The inclu-
sion of specialists amongst the TRIPs Agreement negotiating 
teams appeared to allay these fears.  Even so, developing countries 
delayed the negotiations by debating whether WIPO could better 
serve their interests as a dispute settlement forum.45 
The developing world had already established a strong voice 
within WIPO, using it to argue against higher intellectual property 
standards.  This voice would have significantly strengthened the 
position of developing countries had WIPO followed through on 
its initiative to create their own GATT-independent dispute settle-
ment procedures.46  But the United States wielded its section 30147 
sword, bringing pressure to bear upon the developing world and 
ensuring their belated acceptance of the WTO’s Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding.48  Other critics cautioned against the possibil-
ity of duplicative efforts and overlap between the work of the new 
TRIPs Council and WIPO.49 
In response to these concerns, the two bodies concluded a co-
operative agreement in 1995, in an attempt to coordinate their ef-
forts.50  The TRIPs Agreement already requires WIPO and the 
 
44. See Ulrich Joos & Rainer Moufang, Report on the Second Ringberg-
Symposium, in GATT OR WIPO?  NEW WAYS IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 32 (Friedrich Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1989). 
45. See Trade-Related Intellectual Property Talks Bog Down Again Over GATT-
WIPO Forum Debate, 7 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 373 (Mar. 14, 1990). 
46. See Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Protec-
tion in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 465, 489-90 
(1994).  See Gopal Das, Intellectual Property Dispute, GATT, WIPO:   Of Playing By the 
Game Rules and Rules of the Game, 35 IDEA 149, 174-78 (1994), for a discussion of 
WIPO’s proposed dispute settlement system. 
47. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (Jan. 3, 1975) 
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)). 
48. See Getlan, supra note 35, at 204. 
49. See Joos & Moufang, supra note 44, at 32-33. 
50. See World Intellectual Property Organization-World Trade Organization:  
Agreement between the WIPO and the WTO, at Geneva, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO/WTO Agreement]; see also Adrian 
Otten & Hannu Wager, Nature and Scope of the Agreement:  Compliance with TRIPs:  
The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 410-11 (1996); WTO Group 
to Propose Accord with WIPO on Coordinating Intellectual Property, 12 Int’l Trade Rep. 
MORT.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
1997] THE WTO, WIPO & THE INTERNET 183 
WTO to consult regarding the creation of a central registrar for 
transparency rules and regulations under article 63(2).51  The 
WIPO/WTO Agreement extends this “mutually supportive rela-
tionship” to areas of legal-technical assistance and cooperation 
while providing for open accessibility to each other’s legal re-
sources.52  A final check on possible overlap comes from the fact 
that the TRIPs Agreement covers only four of the nineteen conven-
tions administered by WIPO.53  Despite all of the criticism, the 
TRIPs Agreement came into force along with the rest of the Uru-
guay Round on January 1, 1995.54 
C. The TRIPs Agreement and the WTO 
In one sweeping move, the TRIPs Agreement took many of the 
substantive provisions of the main WIPO conventions, made them 
applicable to WTO members, and created new measures covering 
enforcement and dispute settlement.  The TRIPs Agreement itself 
established only a handful of new international rights, such as a 
right to trade secrets.55  By incorporating the substantive rights of 
the Berne, Rome, and Paris Conventions,56 along with the Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,57 the 
TRIPs Agreement maintained a minimum standards level of pro-
tection.58 
The TRIPs Agreement’s minimum standards formula, a direct 
 
(BNA) No. 38, at 1598 (Sept. 27, 1995). 
51. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2. 
52. WIPO/WTO Agreement, supra note 50, pmbl., arts. 2, 4. 
53. WIPO administers the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Madrid 
Agreement, and the Rome Convention.  See Cordray, supra note 29, at 122-24. 
54. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2. 
55. See Otten & Wager, supra note 50 (describing the differences in protection be-
tween the WIPO treaties and the TRIPs Agreement); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum 
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO 
Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman I]; John G. Byrne, Com-
ment, Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law:  An Overview of the 
Changes Required by GATT, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 121 (1995). 
56. Berne Convention, supra note 17; Rome Convention, supra note 25; Paris 
Convention, supra note 17. 
57. Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, opened for 
signature at Washington, D.C., May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989) [hereinafter Inte-
grated Circuit Treaty]. 
58. See Otten & Wager, supra note 50, at 394-97. 
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descendant of that used previously in international intellectual 
property conventions, contrasts sharply with those of other WTO 
Agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(“Technical Barriers Agreement”)59 and the Agreement on Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (“Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement”).60  Although these other agreements attempt to har-
monize national measures through general guidelines, the TRIPs 
Agreement actually establishes a group of specific rights, which 
serve as a baseline beneath which no member may fall.61  For ex-
ample, the TRIPs Agreement requires all WTO members to abide 
by articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention, whether or not a 
particular member actually belongs to the Berne Convention.62  
Due in part to these specific statutory requirements, membership of 
the WIPO conventions has expanded.  Membership in the Berne 
Convention, for example, has “virtually doubled” since 1986.63 
Integration into the WTO, however, involved more than just 
the cannibalization of the WIPO conventions.  In addition to ex-
panding the effective application of the WIPO treaties, the TRIPs 
Agreement reinforced the crucial principles of national treatment 
and most favored nation, which aim to eliminate discrimination on 
both the national and international levels.64 
Undoubtedly, the most important and controversial aspects of 
intellectual property’s integration into the WTO were enforcement 
and dispute settlement.  Under the TRIPs Agreement, “members 
 
59. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1381 (listing 
agreement reproduced at 18 I.L.M. 1079) [hereinafter Technical Barriers Agreement]. 
60. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade organization, Annex 1A (vis-
ited Sept. 11, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/legal/15-sps.wp5> [hereinafter Phytosani-
tary Measures Agreement]. 
61. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2. 
62. See id. art. 9. 
63. Eric H. Smith, Impact of the TRIPs Agreement on Specific Disciplines:  Copy-
rightable Literary and Artistic Works:  Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the 
TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 559, 561 (1996).  Other possible reasons 
for this expansion include the membership of several newly-independent states and the 
long-delayed accession of the United States. 
64. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3, 4; see also Reichman I, supra note 
55, at 347-51. 
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[must] provide domestic procedures and remedies so that right 
holders can enforce their rights effectively.”65  The twin goals of 
enforcement include (1) facilitating fair and equitable enforcement, 
and (2) deterring future infringement.66  As a corollary to these 
goals, the TRIPs Agreement contains transparency requirements67 
which obligate members to inform the TRIPs Council of any laws 
or regulations directly impacting on enforcement.68  Because inter-
national intellectual property law had previously said little about 
enforcement standards, these additions were considered necessary 
to guarantee the full enjoyment of the TRIPs Agreement’s substan-
tive rights. 
In addition, the TRIPs Agreement incorporates by reference the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding and its progressive approach to 
problem solving.69  Noncompliance with the provisions of the 
TRIPs Agreement constitutes a nullification and impairment of the 
benefits accruing to WTO members on the basis of GATT articles 
XXII and XXIII.70  Together, the enforcement and dispute settle-
ment provisions of the TRIPs Agreement gave international intel-
lectual property conventions the strength they previously lacked. 
Since the formation of the WTO, the TRIPs Agreement has 
been invoked in numerous disputes.71  It was only recently, how-
 
65. Otten & Wager, supra note 50, at 403; see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, 
arts. 41-60. 
66. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 41-60; Otten & Wager, supra note 50, at 
403. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51 (discussing the transparency require-
ments). 
68. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 63. 
69. Id. art. 64(1). 
70. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 64; see also NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra 
note 39, at 2310-13. 
71. As of October 20, 1997, this includes one issued panel report, see India—Patent 
Protection for Pharmaceutical & Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); one active panel, see Indonesia—Certain Measures Affect-
ing the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS55/8 (Aug. 5, 1997) (complaints by the 
United States at WT/DS59); and three pending consultations, see India—Patent Protec-
tion for Pharmaceutical & Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS79/3 
(Nov. 27, 1997); Ireland—Measures Affecting the Grant of Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS82/1 (May 26, 1997); Denmark—Measures Affecting the En-
forcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS83/1 (May 21, 1997).  
Three cases relying on TRIPs principles already have reached settlement.  See Overview 
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ever, that the Dispute Settlement Body released its first panel re-
port interpreting the TRIPs Agreement.72  The India Patent panel 
upheld a United States challenge to India’s implementation of a 
“mailbox” filing system for pharmaceutical and agricultural patent 
applications.73  Article 70(8) of the TRIPs Agreement requires de-
veloping nations, such as India, who provide for no product pat-
ents, to create interim filing procedures so that applications can be 
considered when such protection is eventually created.74 
According to the panel report, India failed to fulfill its obliga-
tions under articles 70(8) and 63, by implementing its system 
through an executive order, rather than through legislative amend-
ment.75  India also violated article 70(9) by not instituting exclu-
sive marketing rights for applicants.76  While the Indian govern-
ment is appealing the decision formally, it simultaneously is 
seeking to forge a domestic political consensus, which will allow it 
to fulfill its WTO obligations.77  This indicates a willingness on the 
part of India to work within the framework of the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding and to respect its commitments under the 
TRIPs Agreement, a quality which has been the hallmark of suc-
cess in disputes involving the other WTO disciplines.78 
 
of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (visited Jan. 2, 1998) 
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>. 
72. See India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical & Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997). 
73. See id. 
74. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 70(8).  Developing nations must phase-
in patent protection by January 1, 2005.  See id. art. 66(1). 
75. See Marc Selinger, Barshefsky Hails WTO ‘Precedent’ in Drug Patent Dispute 
With India, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1522 (Sept. 10, 1997). 
76. See id. 
77. See N. Vasuki Rao, India to Appeal WTO Ruling on Patent System, J. COM., 
Sept. 12, 1997, at 4A. 
78. See, e.g., European Community—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997) (hormones in livestock farm-
ing); United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) (regulating fuel and fuel additives), WTO Doc. 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (Appellate Body report); Canada—Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997) (prohibiting importa-
tion of split-run editions of United States periodicals), WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (June 
30, 1997) (Appellate Body report); European Community—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R7/HND (May 22, 1997) (dis-
tributing bananas in Europe), WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (Appellate 
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While it would be premature to label the India Patent case as a 
victory for the TRIPs Agreement and the WTO system, the initial 
outlook is promising.  Ultimately, however, the successful future 
of international intellectual property protection depends on more 
than just the merger of substantive law with enforcement and dis-
pute settlement procedures.  It rests on the ability of substantive 
law to adapt to the rapidly changing world of technology.  This is 
because the TRIPs Agreement “leaves notable gaps and loop-
holes . . . especially with respect to nontraditional objects of intel-
lectual property protection.”79  The question of how the WTO and 
WIPO will respond to this challenge may well prove the ultimate 
test of the TRIPs Agreement and of the symbiotic institutional ar-
rangement it created. 
II. THE INTERNET TREATIES 
Major issues and players are responsible for shaping the nego-
tiation of the Internet Treaties.  Because of the potential impact of 
these treaties upon the burgeoning electronic marketplace, this part 
considers the intrinsic difficulties in applying traditional copyright 
principles to the Internet.  The Diplomatic Conference, which re-
sulted in the new treaties, debated these difficulties at length.  
Typically, the discussion diverged along two lines:  (1) those sup-
porting the extension of traditional copyright principles to digital 
technologies (the “copyright purists”),80 and (2) those championing 
the loose application or modification of current theory (the “inno-
vators”).81  By examining the views of these groups, along with the 
influence they wielded at the Diplomatic Conference, it is possible 
to gain a clear understanding of how the proposed texts evolved 
into the final drafts. 
A. The Internet and Intellectual Property Challenges 
One of the most pressing and difficult challenges for intellec-
tual property lawyers in recent years has involved reconciling tra-
 
Body report). 
79. Reichman I, supra note 55, at 347.  Examples include weak industrial design 
protection and no sui generis rights for functional design. 
80. See infra Part II.C.1. 
81. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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ditional intellectual property rights with the rapidly changing tech-
nology of the information superhighway.82  The word “Internet” 
has become ubiquitous in our daily vocabulary, referring to an in-
terlocking system of computer networks which communicate with 
each other by transmitting data through a series of servers.83  A 
useful analogy is a spider web, such that “[a]t each point where the 
strands meet is a computer/server.  Data goes down the strands, of-
ten through several intermediate servers before arriving at final 
destinations.”84 
This web lacks any central organization and expands well be-
yond the conventional boundaries of territory or government regu-
lation.  The reason for this decentralization lies in the Internet’s 
historical roots.  In the 1960s, the Defense Department’s Advanced 
Research Projects Agency began to experiment with linking the 
military’s command computers in an effort to protect them from a 
Soviet attack.85  Because of its usefulness, this “Arpanet” eventu-
ally grew to include governmental and educational organizations, 
thereby garnering the new moniker “Internet.”86 
Today, 11 million American households access the World 
Wide Web, a text and graphics-based interface, and 50 million web 
pages exist.87  Over $200 million in commerce was completed over 
the Internet in 1995, with the growth potential for billions by the 
year 2000.88  The Internet is quickly changing the way in which 
the world communicates, interacts, and does business. 
The Internet’s growing importance and expansive nature gives 
 
82. See generally Bruce A. Lehman, Global Intellectual Property in the Twenty-
First Century, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 9 (1996) (addressing the 
global information infrastructure and the evolution of intellectual property laws). 
83. See Ramo, supra note 3, at 58-59. 
84. Patrick F. McGowan, The Internet and Intellectual Property Issues, 455 
PLI/PAT. 303, 312 (1996). 
85. See id.; see also Christine Biederman & Jamie Murphy, Rebellion Over Who 
Controls the Net, N.Y. TIMES CYBERTIMES (Nov. 23, 1996) (visited Jan. 2, 1998) 
<http://www.cybertimes.com>. 
86. See Benjamin R. Kuhn, Comment, A Dilemma in Cyberspace and Beyond:  
Copyright Law for Intellectual Property Distributed Over the Information Superhigh-
ways of Today and Tomorrow, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 171, 180 (1996); Biederman 
& Murphy, supra note 85. 
87. See Betty Ann Bowser, NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 25, 1996). 
88. See Yerkey, supra note 8. 
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intellectual property owners reason for concern about the dissemi-
nation of their protected property.  For example, when an author of 
a story places text on a web page, he or she instantaneously makes 
it available to users of the Internet.  It is difficult to determine at 
which point the text is sufficiently “fixed” to qualify for copyright 
protection.89  Several alternatives exist:  (1) when it is saved on the 
author’s hard drive,90 (2) when it appears on a computer screen, (3) 
when it is temporarily copied on a series of intermediate servers, or 
(4) when a copy is printed onto paper.  Moreover, it is unclear 
which country’s law would apply to someone who downloaded the 
text in another country and consequently infringed upon the au-
thor’s copyright,91 or to what extent the “fair use” exception92 
would apply.  Who exactly would carry the burden of policing in-
fringers also is uncertain.  Current international intellectual prop-
erty conventions provide no ready answers to any of these ques-
tions.  Truly, “[c]opyright laws are under technological siege.”93 
B. Movement Toward a Conference 
In 1989, WIPO organized the Committee of Experts on a Pos-
sible Protocol to the Berne Convention “destined to clarify the ex-
isting, or establish new, international norms where, under the pre-
sent text of the Berne Convention, doubts may exist as to the 
 
89. United States law provides, in relevant part, that “[c]opyright protection sub-
sists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”  17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
90. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comp. Servs. Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that temporary copies on a computer’s RAM constitute a copy under sec-
tion 101 of Copyright Act). 
91. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 
1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the Italian defendant violated the injunction against 
distributing its product in United States because soliciting customers through the defen-
dant’s web page constituted “deliberate and intentional contact with the United States”). 
92. The fair use exception grants a privilege in others than the copyright owner to 
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the owner’s consent.  See 
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(applying the U.S. fair use exception). 
93. Peter H. Lewis, 160 Nations Meet to Weigh Revision of Copyright Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at A1. 
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extent to which that Convention applies.”94  Doubts existed be-
cause traditional copyright principles are based upon national 
boundaries.95  The Internet makes many of these principles obso-
lete because “anything from music to software can be duplicated 
and distributed at the click of a computer mouse.”96  The Commit-
tee of Experts met in 1991 and 1992 to discuss several possible an-
swers to these questions, including the extension of the Berne 
Convention to electronically transmitted works and the creation of 
an agreement covering the rights of sound recording producers.97 
More specialized committees met over the next four years in an 
attempt to establish an agenda for an eventual conference to nego-
tiate both a Berne Convention Protocol and a treaty covering per-
formances and phonograms.  After the European Community 
adopted a directive to provide databases with sui generis protec-
tion in early 1996,98 both the Europeans and Americans began to 
push an additional proposal aimed at creating a commensurate in-
ternational right.99  Following discussions on proposals made by 
various states, a Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights Questions (“Diplomatic Conference”) was fi-
nally scheduled for December 1996 in Geneva, Switzerland.100 
At the September 1996, Information Superhighway Summit in 
Singapore, WIPO began to circulate three proposals for discussion 
 
94. Basic Proposal on the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Ques-
tions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the 
Diplomatic Conference, at ¶ 1, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter 
WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright]. 
95. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communs. Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
96. Cyberspace Piracy is Target of Geneva Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at C10 
[hereinafter Cyberspace Piracy]. 
97. See Robert A. Cinque, Note, Making Cyberspace Safe for Copyright:  The Pro-
tection of Electronic Works in a Protocol to the Berne Convention, 18 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1258, 1261 (1995); see also WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 103, ¶ 2. 
98. See Council Directive 96/977, 1996 O.J. (L 96) 2. 
99. See John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Dweck, WIPO Pacts Go Digital:  Pro-
posed International Treaties Will Open Up Domestic Debate on Treatment of Electronic 
Works, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at C1. 
100. WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, ¶ 4-11.  Proposals and 
comments were submitted by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Com-
munity and its Member States, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea, South Africa, the Sudan, the United States, and Uruguay. 
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at the Diplomatic Conference.101  The first proposal, entitled 
“Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Liter-
ary and Artistic Works,” dealt with expanding the protection of lit-
erary and artistic works under the Berne Convention.102  The sec-
ond text, “Treaty for the Protection of the Rights of Performers and 
Producers of Phonograms,” used the Rome Convention as a model, 
in an attempt to raise performers and producers of phonograms to 
the same level of protection as authors.103  Finally, the “Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases” marked the first at-
tempt at a treaty protecting compilations of data.104 
C. The Players 
Although most observers agreed on the need for some sort of 
international accord dealing with digital and electronic intellectual 
property transmission, reactions to the WIPO proposals varied 
greatly.105  Indeed, much of the debate over this topic has become 
polarized among various sectors, each of which exerted its influ-
ence during the Diplomatic Conference.106  A recent law review 
article provides an interesting analogy by which to understand this 
political dynamic.107 
Professor Hugh Hansen of Fordham University School of Law 
compares the different philosophies of lawyers involved in the in-
ternational copyright field to those of various religious figures.108  
Copyright lawyers are likened to a “secular priesthood” because of 
their devotion to traditional intellectual property ideals, while 
newer, more technologically-minded attorneys receive the title of 
“agnostics and atheists” on the basis of their questioning attitude 
 
101. See WIPO Should Strengthen Copyright Standards on Internet, Conferees Say, 
13 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1406 (Sept. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Conferees]. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See Lewis, supra note 93. 
106. See Seth Schiesel, Global Agreement Reached to Widen Law on Copyright, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Schiesel I]. 
107. See Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright:  An Unorthodox Analysis, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579 (1996). 
108. See id. 
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toward the traditionalists.109  “Missionaries” include trade-oriented 
persons who seek to expand copyright protection around the world, 
particularly through the WTO.110 
While this paradigm provides insight into the legal ideologies 
competing in the international copyright community, many other 
economic and technological factors come into play when dealing 
with intellectual property and the Internet.  Various interests con-
tributed their own perspectives and agendas to the debate over the 
final texts of the treaties during the Diplomatic Conference.111  Al-
though the distinction is somewhat artificial, this Article groups 
these interests into two categories:  “copyright purists” and “inno-
vators.” 
1. Copyright Purists 
“Copyright purists” include a wide cross-section of interests, 
such as intellectual property practitioners, the Clinton Administra-
tion, WIPO officials, and copyright holders in the entertainment 
and music industries.112  The purists believe “that copyright laws 
provide the best protection for the upcoming boom in electronic 
commerce and information transfer.”113  The purists’ motivation, 
however, comes not only from an affinity for the intellectual 
framework of copyright; it derives equally from the desire “to halt 
the growing international trend to pirate billions of dollars’ worth 
of intellectual property.  Without stronger protections, they argue, 
there will be no incentive to develop new material to sate the appe-
tite of the emerging global-information infrastructure.”114 
Indeed, the film and recording industries found themselves 
aligned with President Clinton’s Administration in their support 
for most of WIPO’s proposals, largely because they would gain 
greatly from strong copyright standards involving the Internet.115  
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. See Schiesel I, supra note 106. 
112. See generally id. (identifying supporters and opponents of new treaties). 
113. Conferees, supra note 101, at 1406 (citing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) senior legal counselor Michael Keplinger). 
114. Lewis, supra note 93. 
115. See id. 
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As a part of President Clinton’s digital agenda,116 the negotiating 
team in Geneva emphasized the importance of the Internet Treaties 
as “the cornerstone of international economic law for the informa-
tion and technological age of the 21st century.”117  This position is 
taken with good reason; United States copyrights account for over 
$50 billion of exports each year, an amount greater than any manu-
facturing sector.118 
Given the ease with which otherwise protected materials can be 
accessed and infringed over the Internet, without any remuneration 
to the copyright holder, it is understandable that in the absence of a 
legal regime protecting their rights, copyright holders would likely 
refrain from entering into an electronic marketplace.119  The result 
would be to significantly chill the development of the Internet as a 
forum for international trade.120  In light of the intimate connection 
between the Internet, intellectual property, and the development of 
an electronic marketplace, President Clinton’s Administration has 
embraced WIPO as a harbinger of economic change.121  Thus, the 
position of “purists,” that traditional copyright intrinsically gov-
erns the transmission of protected works over the Internet, must be 
viewed in light of the substantial economic factors involved. 
2. The Innovators 
On the other side of the debate, the “innovators” include a 
large and diverse group of scholars, technicians, librarians, con-
sumer groups, and corporations.122  They believe that traditional 
copyright principles can adequately protect digital and electronic 
 
116. President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address, in WASH. POST, Feb. 
5, 1997, at A18. 
117. Schiesel I, supra note 106 (quoting PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman). 
118. See Jonathan Newcomb, Creators Have Most to Lose in Copyright Pact, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at A14. 
119. See Lewis, supra note 93; J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent 
and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman II]. 
120. See Schiesel I, supra note 106; see also Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copy-
right, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 300 (1996). 
121. See Schiesel I, supra note 106. 
122. See generally James Neal, Copyright & Cyberspace:  A Librarian’s View of 
the WIPO Conference, AM. LIBR., Feb. 1997, at 34 (describing how most librarians view 
the WIPO Conference). 
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works only if they are loosely applied or modified.123  For exam-
ple, a member of the American Library Association’s executive 
board recently noted that “[l]ibraries’ ability to support the infor-
mation needs of their users is severely threatened by those forces 
seeking to combat electronic piracy and to create an Internet com-
merce.”124  Therefore, these innovators are primarily concerned 
with finding a balance between fostering both the growth of the 
Internet and the free flow of information while respecting the in-
terests of intellectual property holders.125 
This is particularly true for telecommunications (“telecom”) 
companies and Internet service providers (“ISPs”) who fear the 
heavy cost and obligation of policing for potential infringers.126  If 
ISPs had to monitor transmissions passing through their servers, 
the additional costs would likely slow down service and raise 
prices, thereby retarding the Internet’s growth.127 
The innovators also worry that “premature or excessive regula-
tion might discourage the development of network architecture and 
the emergence of new business and cultural models.”128  In this 
way, the norms created at WIPO’s Diplomatic Conference will 
govern not only the digital transmission of intellectual property, 
but the future face of world trade.  Although care should be taken 
to note other developing areas of digital commerce, including elec-
tronic data interchange, the U.N. Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce, and trade in culture, the treaties resulting from the Diplo-
matic Conference are notable for the crucial role they will play in 
shaping the content of the Internet and the influence that the pur-
ists and innovators had in crafting it. 
 
123. See id. 
124. Neal, supra note 122. 
125. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement:  Imperialistic, Outdated, and 
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 620 (1996). 
126. See Seth Schiesel, Copyright Pacts are Still Facing Foes in Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1997, at 61 [hereinafter Sciesel II]. 
127. See Fraser, supra note 122, at 796-97. 
128. Peter Jaszi, Essay (visited May 16, 1997) 
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/jaszi.html>. 
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D. The Internet Treaties 
WIPO’s Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights Questions convened in Geneva from Decem-
ber 2 to 20, 1996.129  In the end, the participants reached a consen-
sus on treaties dealing with copyright130 and performances and 
phonograms.131  The database proposal, however, met with signifi-
cant opposition and was tabled for further discussion at a Spring, 
1997 meeting in the Philippines.132  The substantial lack of acri-
mony between the developed and developing countries surprised 
commentators.133  According to the United States delegation 
leader, Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Commissioner Bruce 
Lehman, the “enthusiasm [at the conference] was not limited to 
major producers of intellectual property like the United States, the 
European Union, India, South Africa and Japan.”134 
In fact, of the thirty-five delegations to sign the two Internet 
Treaties by December 22, 1997, many are members of the develop-
ing world.135  The United States was not among the initial signato-
ries because of limitations in the delegation’s negotiating author-
ity, but it did sign the Final Act of the Conference.136  According 
to their terms, the Internet Treaties remained open for signature by 
any WIPO member until December 31, 1997.137  The final texts 
 
129. See WIPO Press Release No. 105, supra note 5. 
130. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1. 
131. See Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7. 
132. See WIPO Official Produces, Withdraws Redraft of Online Copyright Treaty, 
13 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1946 (Dec. 18, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Official]. 
133. See USIA:  Bruce Lehman on New Intellectual Property Treaties, M2 
PRESSWIRE, Apr. 7, 1997. 
134. Id. 
135. Signatories of both treaties include:  Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chile, Croatia, 
Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Kabakhstan, Kenya, Mongolia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic 
of Moldovia, Togo, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  See Signatories of Treaties Administered 
by WIPO not yet in force:  WIPO Copyright Treaty (visited Dec. 28, 1997) 
<http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/s-copy.htm>; WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (visited Dec. 28, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/s-perf.htm>. 
136. Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/98 (Dec. 23, 
1996).  The Internet Treaties will not be be ratified as treaties under U.S. law because 
fast track procedures are unavailable and because of the difficulty of obtaining the re-
quired two-thirds ratification vote in the Senate.  Rather, the Internet Treaties will be in-
corporated into U.S. law through implementing legislation. 
137. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 19; Phonogram Treaty, supra 
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vary in some key ways from the original proposals, illustrating im-
portant qualities of the negotiations and posing interesting ques-
tions about WIPO’s relationship with the WTO.138 
1. The Databases Proposal 
The Databases Proposal would have established, for the first 
time, a form of sui generis protection “irrespective of any protec-
tion provided for a database or its contents by copyright or by 
other rights granted by [Berne Convention members] in their na-
tional legislation.”139  Major support for this initiative came from 
the European Community, which, in 1996, enacted a similar pro-
tection to be implemented in 1997.  Under the TRIPs Agreement 
and in the United States, database protection exists only for “com-
pilations . . . when there is copyrightable authorship by virtue of 
the selection, coordination, or arrangement of information or 
data.”140  Because this sui generis system is so new, and as yet un-
tested in the European Community, the delegates universally 
agreed to postpone their deliberations until a meeting in early 1997 
to schedule further preparatory work.141 
2. WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty supplements the Berne Conven-
tion by providing copyright protection while considering the need 
for the free flow of information.  Nevertheless, although the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty establishes crucial rights, it has left significant 
gaps in the law which must be resolved by national legislation. 
 
note 7, art. 28.  The signature deadline will likely be extended to ensure the treaties’ en-
try into force. 
138. See discussion infra Parts II.D.1-2. 
139. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Databases to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, 
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996), art. 1(3). 
140. Eric J. Schwartz, Impact of the Two New WIPO Copyright Treaties, 3 INTELL. 
PROP. STRATEGIST No. 4, at 1, Jan. 1997; see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 
10(2). 
141. See Kennedy & Dweck, supra note 99; Recommendation Concerning Data-
bases, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/100 (Dec. 23, 1996). 
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a. The Scope of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The Preamble to the WIPO Copyright Treaty sets the tone of 
the document and provides some context for its substantive provi-
sions.  Along with expressing a desire to maintain effective and 
uniform protection of literary and artistic rights, it recognizes the 
need for new rules and the reinterpretation of old ones, to provide 
this protection in light of developing information and communica-
tion technologies.142  Two provisions added during the course of 
negotiations emphasize the importance of copyright as an incentive 
for creative efforts, while recognizing the need to balance rights of 
the authors with the public interest in the free flow of informa-
tion.143  These additions echo the concerns of telecom companies, 
ISPs, and other “innovators” who lobbied the WIPO Conference 
heavily to ensure that their interests were considered in the formu-
lation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty’s substantive law. 
During its initial preparatory stages, the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty was envisioned as a protocol to the Berne Convention, up-
dating that agreement for the first time since 1971.144  As it 
emerged from the Diplomatic Conference, however, the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty is “not an accessory to the Berne Convention.  Its 
objective is rather to supplement and update the international re-
gime . . . based fundamentally on the Berne Convention.”145  This 
is despite the WIPO Copyright Treaty’s status as a “special agree-
ment” within the meaning of article 20 of the Berne Convention.146 
Special agreements typically involve bilateral accords granting 
higher levels of protection or, as in the case of the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty, documents establishing rights in related areas.147  The 
WIPO Copyright Treaty does, indeed, rely heavily on Berne by ex-
tending its eligibility, definition, and guaranteed rights provisions 
 
142. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, pmbl. 
143. See id. 
144. See WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, art. 1(1)-(3). 
145. See id. at n.0.01. 
146. Id. art. 1(1).  Berne permits these types of agreements “in so far as [they] grant 
to authors more extensive rights than those granted by [Berne], or contain other provi-
sions not contrary to [it].”  Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 20. 
147. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:  1886-1986, at 685-86 (1987). 
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mutatis mutandis and mandating compliance with articles 1 
through 21 and the Appendix.148  This change in status reflects the 
delegates’ desire to supplement international copyright protection 
in these new areas, without derogating from any of the rights al-
ready established in Berne.149 
The general scope of copyright protection enunciated in article 
2 includes expression per se rather than “ideas, procedures, meth-
ods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”150  In that 
same vein, data compilations receive the same protection as under 
the TRIPs Agreement’s article 10—only in so far as the selection 
or arrangement of content involves intellectual creativity, as data 
itself cannot be copyrighted.151  Article 4 additionally extends pro-
tection to computer programs as literary works, whatever the mode 
or form of their expression, thereby broadening slightly the protec-
tion previously granted under the TRIPs Agreement, which is lim-
ited to “source or object code.”152  Although these provisions es-
sentially codify current copyright practice,153 article 9 modifies the 
twenty-five year period of protection for photographic works, ini-
tially established in the Berne Convention, by extending it to the 
general fifty year rule.154  Berne’s provisions for application in 
time, however, are retained.155 
b. Substantive Provisions 
The WIPO Copyright Treaty establishes three crucial rights:  
 
148. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3 (applying articles 2 through 6 of 
the Berne Convention).  The WIPO Copyright Treaty contains provisions explaining the 
scope of copyright protection.  Id. art. 2. 
149. Id. art. 1(1)-(2). 
150. Id. art. 2. 
151. Id. art. 5.  Some minor differences in language exist between the TRIPs 
Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.  The substance of their protection, however, 
remains the same.  See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 10(2). 
152. See id. art. 10(1); WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4. 
153. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 2, 4, 10. 
154. See id. art. 9; see also Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 7(4). 
155. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 13; Berne Convention, supra 
note 17, art. 18.  Protection under Berne and the WIPO Copyright Treaty only extends to 
works which, at the moment of the agreement’s entry into force, “have not yet fallen into 
the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.”  
Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 18(1). 
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distribution, rental, and communication to the public.156  The right 
of distribution previously existed under the Berne Convention, but 
only for cinematographic works.157  Article 6 of the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty extends this right to authors of all literary and artistic 
works, whether the distribution is accomplished through sale or 
other means of transferring ownership.158  An understanding was 
reached limiting this right to fixed, tangible copies capable of cir-
culation.159 
Delegates at the Diplomatic Conference, however, could not 
agree on the scope of the doctrine of exhaustion for distribution 
rights after first sale.160  The initial WIPO proposal provided two 
alternatives:  (1) national or regional exhaustion, which was fa-
vored by the United States, or (2) global or international exhaus-
tion, supported by Australia, Canada, and China.161  In a compro-
mise, the delegates decided to allow each state to define 
exhaustion within its own borders.162  An accompanying right of 
importation, which would have given copyright holders the exclu-
sive right to authorize importation of their works, fell by the way-
side during the negotiations.163 
Article 7 vests the exclusive right of commercial rental in au-
thors of computer programs, cinematographic works, and works 
embodied in phonograms.164  Previously, no right of rental existed 
under the Berne Convention.  The TRIPs Agreement created this 
right for the first time in cinematographic works and computer 
 
156. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 6-8. 
157. Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 14(1)(i). 
158. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6(1). 
159. See Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 6, 7, 
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Agreed Statements—Copyright]. 
160. See WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, at n.8.02 (“In many ju-
risdictions, the principle is that in respect of a copy of a work the right of distribution 
ceases to exist, i.e., is exhausted, after the first sale of that copy.”). 
161. See WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, at n.8.04. 
162. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6(2). 
163. See WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, at n.8.05. 
164. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7(1).  Delegates agreed that an ex-
clusive right of commercial rental need not be granted with respect to phonograms in 
Contracting Parties whose law provides no phonogram protection.  See Agreed State-
ments—Copyright, supra note 159, art. 7. 
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programs, but limits its application in two situations.165  First, it 
exempts cinematographic works where their rental has led to copy-
ing so widespread it materially impairs the exclusive right of re-
production.166  The second situation excludes computer programs 
“where the program itself is not the essential object of the 
rental.”167  These two exceptions are retained in the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty, which also grandfathers equitable remuneration sys-
tems for authors of rented works embodied in phonograms.168  This 
right of rental differs significantly from WIPO’s original proposal, 
which would have covered all literary and artistic works, except 
for those whose rental resulted in an impairment of the right of re-
production.169 
Perhaps the most important right contained in the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty regards the Internet; the right of public communica-
tion permits copyright holders to make their works available by 
“wire or wireless means.”170  Included within this right is the abil-
ity to make works available to the public “in such a way that mem-
bers of the public may access [them] from a place and at a time in-
dividually chosen by them.”171  This logically includes 
transmission over the Internet, even though the WIPO Expert 
Committee felt strongly that the crucial act in terms of “communi-
cation” involves “making the work available, not the mere provi-
sion of server space, communication connections, or facilities for 
the carriage and routing of signals.”172  According to the Expert 
Committee’s original proposal, communication does not involve 
any exhaustion of rights because that doctrine only involves the 
distribution of tangible copies.173  Where communication permits 
recipients to reproduce a tangible copy, national law must define 
 
165. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 11. 
166. See id. 
167. Id. 
168. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7(2), (3).  The equitable remu-
neration systems for works embodied in phonograms must have existed prior to April 15, 
1994, and must continue to the present day.  See id. art. 7(3). 
169. See WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, art. 9(1). 
170. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8. 
171. Id. 
172. See WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, at n.10.10. 
173. See id. at n.10.20. 
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liability for infringement.174 
ISPs and telecom firms in the United States, in fact, have de-
manded a clarification of article 8 as a condition of any legislation 
of domestic implementation.175  These companies fear that “a 
broad interpretation of article 8 could lead to lawsuits against tele-
com carriers from copyright . . . owners.”176  Other legislative 
clarifications undoubtedly will be necessary because all of the 
rights created in the WIPO Copyright Treaty simply establish their 
international scope and leave the details of enforcement to the con-
tracting parties. 
Another area in which national legislation must fill in the 
blanks left by the WIPO Copyright Treaty involves its limitations 
and exceptions.  Article 10 permits the contracting parties to flesh 
out the WIPO Copyright Treaty’s details, as long as they “do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”177  These 
limitations and exceptions include those already recognized under 
the Berne Convention and any new ones deemed appropriate in 
light of the digital network environment.178 
Two additional obligations close out the substantive provi-
sions.  The contracting parties must provide adequate legal protec-
tion and effective remedies for authors where infringers circum-
vent technical measures used in the exercise of rights under either 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the Berne Convention.179  Similar 
provisions must be made to protect authors against the removal or 
alteration of rights management information.180  Rights manage-
ment information includes the identity of the work, its author, any 
rights holder, or the terms and conditions of its use.181 
 
174. See id. at nn.10.20-10.21. 
175. See Coalition Urges Clarification of Global Copyright Treaties, Telecom Rep. 
(BRP) (Mar. 3, 1997). 
176. Id. 
177. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10(1). 
178. Id. art. 10(2); see also Agreed Statements—Copyright, supra note 159, art. 10. 
179. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11. 
180. Id. art. 12(1). 
181. Id. art. 12(2). 
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c. Enforcement Provisions 
One of the most significant changes which occurred during the 
negotiation process of the WIPO Copyright Treaty concerned its 
enforcement provisions.  The original WIPO proposal included 
two alternatives, each based upon the TRIPs Agreement’s en-
forcement articles.182  Alternative A incorporated by reference the 
TRIPs Agreement’s articles 41 through 61 via an annex which 
would have formed an “integral” part of the treaty.183  Alternative 
B instead required that the contracting parties integrate articles 41 
through 61 into their national laws.184  Although most of the dele-
gates preferred incorporating the TRIPs Agreement’s provisions 
into the new treaty in some way,185 neither approach was 
adopted.186 
Following the United States’s position, article 14 of the final 
draft simply requires national authorities to adopt those measures 
necessary to ensure the WIPO Copyright Treaty’s application and 
to punish and prevent infringement.187  This constitutes a stunning 
rejection of the TRIPs Agreement’s enforcement guidelines, con-
sidering that even WIPO officials admit “that there would be huge 
technical problems in enforcing copyright legislation” because na-
tional liability standards differ.188  As a result, in order for the 
TRIPs Agreement’s enforcement guidelines to apply, the WTO 
must integrate the WIPO Copyright Treaty within the substantive 
provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. 
d. Excluded Provisions 
In addition to the various modifications made during the nego-
tiation process, two key articles failed to survive to the final text.  
Proposed article 3 attempted to standardize the notion of place of 
 
182. WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, n.16.01. 
183. Id. art. 16. 
184. Id. 
185. See Seth Greenstein, News From WIPO:  Day Eight—Enforcement, Frame-
work Issues and Framing the Issues (visited Jan. 2, 1998) <http://www.hrrc.org/wr_12-
11.html> [hereinafter Greenstein I]. 
186. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 14. 
187. Id. 
188. Cyberspace Piracy, supra note 96. 
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publication for works transmitted by wire or wireless means.189  
Electronic transmission would have been deemed a form of publi-
cation under article 3(3) of the Berne Convention, in so far as the 
public could access and copy works at their convenience.190  The 
place of publication would have been considered where the neces-
sary arrangements for public access were completed, such as 
where the source data file was established.191 
Instead, the delegates could not agree on the necessity of the 
article and elected to leave it for further consultations.192  This de-
cision was made in spite of the Expert Committee’s argument that 
the definition of “published works” and “country of origin” were 
central to protection of works and that uniform interpretation of 
terms would be important.193  The full effect of the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty’s failure to define these basic principles cannot be 
predicted, although the potential for significant conflict between 
national standards exists. 
A second major omission involves the right of reproduction, 
which was deleted as a result of a last-minute campaign by Ameri-
can and European corporate interests.194  Proposed article 7 would 
have included, in its exclusive right of reproduction, all forms of 
temporary reproduction, including intermediate copies on network 
 
189. WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, at n.3.01-3.14. 
190. See id. art. 3(1). 
191. See id. at n.3.12.  For example, the place of publication for a web page would 
be wherever the computer files which make up the page are stored. 
192. See Seth Greenstein, News from WIPO:  Day Six—Tackling the Tough Issues 
(visited Oct. 19, 1997) <http://www.hrrc.org/wr_12-9.html> [hereinafter Greenstein II]. 
193. The Proposal states that the definitions are: 
central to the question of whether and how the Berne Convention can continue 
to protect works in the new digital environment.  To the extent that any nations 
may now have different opinions on the meaning of these [terms] there are cer-
tainly well-founded reasons to require that all Contracting Parties interpret and 
apply these provisions in a uniform manner. 
WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, at n.3.07. 
194. See generally John Parry & Carol Oberdorfer, WIPO Delegates Agree on Two 
Copyright Treaties, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 11 (Jan. 1, 1997) (describing the 
agreements arrived at by the WIPO delegates); Consolidated Recommendation of Inter-
national Non-governmental Organizations and Associations (visited Jan. 2, 1998) 
<http://www.hrrc.org/pp_12-16.html> (including a list of corporate and nongovernmental 
organizations opposing draft language) [hereinafter Consolidated Recommendation]. 
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servers and in computer memories.195  This definition displeased 
ISPs and telecom companies who feared it would stifle Internet 
growth and subject them to infringement liability because such 
copies are natural by-products of communication via the Internet. 
Several American ISPs and telecom companies joined nongov-
ernmental organizations in formulating a consolidated recommen-
dation to the Diplomatic Conference expressing their concerns.196  
This lobbying campaign also extended to President Clinton, who 
received a similar letter from domestic corporations asking the 
government to change its position.197  Eventually the delegates re-
lented and eliminated the article while agreeing in a declaration of 
intent to return to the issue later.198 
The ability of private corporate interests to shape significantly 
the outcome of an intellectual property treaty indicates the impor-
tance of both copyright and the Internet to the future of world 
trade.  Despite this, the retention of a minimum standards-type re-
gime199 in the WIPO Copyright Treaty may actually inhibit the de-
velopment of a global marketplace, due to the intrinsic difficulties 
caused by applying different national standards to a technology 
which confounds physical and geographic borders. 
3. The Phonogram Treaty 
The Phonogram Treaty provides protection for performers and 
producers, while considering the need to improve international 
rules in light of changes in technology.  Thus, the Phonogram 
Treaty establishes crucial rights, which are a result of balancing 
the rights of the general public.  Nevertheless, the Phonogram 
Treaty—like the WIPO Copyright Treaty—requires national legis-
lation to remove many uncertainties presently in the law. 
 
195. WIPO Basic Proposal—Copyright, supra note 94, art. 7; WIPO Official, supra 
note 132.  This includes copies in a computer’s RAM. 
196. Consolidated Recommendation, supra note 194. 
197. See Joint Letter from Chief Executive Officers to President William J. Clinton 
(Dec. 10, 1996), available in WESTLAW, West Legal News, 12-16-96 WLN 13352. 
198. See Parry & Oberdorfer, supra note 194. 
199. See discussion supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
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a. The Scope of the Phonogram Treaty 
Like its sister treaty, the Phonogram Treaty bears the mark of 
the public debate which surrounded the Diplomatic Conference.200 
The preamble expresses the delegates’ desire to promote the effec-
tive and uniform development of performers’ and producers’ rights 
in phonograms, while acknowledging the need for new interna-
tional rules to cope with the changing times and technologies.201  It 
also contains an analog to the WIPO Copyright Treaty’s provision 
on balancing the rights of intellectual property holders along with 
those of the general public.202 
Unlike its counterpart, the Phonogram Treaty has no special 
agreement relationship with its progenitor, the Rome Convention. 
It does, however, imitate the Rome Convention’s language, distin-
guishing between protected intellectual property rights in phono-
grams and the copyright applicable to works which are embodied 
in phonograms.203  Put simply, the Phonogram Treaty only covers 
the various rights of performers and producers in a recorded work, 
while leaving copyright issues, such as a composer’s interest in his 
song, to the Berne Convention.204  Nonetheless, the Phonogram 
Treaty “intend[s] to be a comprehensive instrument rather than 
[one] that clarifies existing norms.”205  The reason for this inten-
tion is that, until the conclusion of the Phonogram Treaty, no major 
international agreement existed protecting phonographic rights be-
yond that of reproduction. 
 
200. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7. 
201. Id. pmbl. 
202. Id. 
203. See Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty, art. 1, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/97 (Dec. 23, 1996).  Compare Rome Convention, 
supra note 25, art. 1 (distinguishing between copyrighted works embedded in phono-
grams and intellectual property rights in phonograms), with Phonogram Treaty, supra 
note 7, art. 1(1)-(2) (same). 
204. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7. 
205. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty For the Protection 
of the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms to be Considered by the Dip-
lomatic Conference, at n.0.06, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/5 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Ba-
sic Proposal—Phonogram]. 
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b. Substantive Provisions 
Article 2 redefines many of the basic concepts originally con-
tained in the Rome Convention, and adds several new ones.206  For 
example, while the Rome Convention described a “phonogram” as 
“any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance or of 
other sounds,”207 the Phonogram Treaty broadly integrates some of 
the many technological changes which have occurred in the past 
thirty years, such as digital sound, while excluding other media 
like video recordings.208  It reads, “the fixation of the sounds of a 
performance or of other sounds, or of a representation of sounds, 
other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a cinemato-
graphic or other audiovisual work.”209  Similarly, the new defini-
tion of “broadcasting” includes satellite transmissions and en-
crypted signals.210  Among the terms added in the Phonogram 
Treaty are “fixation” and “communication to the public,”211 all of 
which indicate the need for broader definitions and protections for 
performances and phonograms, considering the numerous techno-
logical means by which they can be transmitted. 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Phonogram Treaty establish the condi-
tions for protection by setting up “points of attachment” for na-
tional treatment in a manner similar to the approach used in the 
TRIPs Agreement.212  National treatment must be accorded to na-
tionals of other contracting parties for all of the exclusive rights 
granted in the Phonogram Treaty, including the right to equitable 
remuneration.213  The Rome Convention’s eligibility criteria are 
incorporated by reference, including the power to exclude certain 
 
206. Id. at n.2.01-2.27. 
207. Rome Convention, supra note 25, art. 3(b). 
208. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 2(b). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. art. 2(f). 
211. Id. art. 2(c), (g).  Other definitions were eliminated in an attempt to preserve 
clarity.  Examples include “reproduction” and “rebroadcasting.”  See Rome Convention, 
supra note 25, art. 3(e), (g); Basic Proposal—Phonogram, supra note 205, at n.2.10, 
2.23. 
212. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 3, 4; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, 
art. 1(3). 
213. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4.  Equitable remuneration includes li-
censing mechanisms like ASCAP. 
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criteria.214  Because of the familiarity of this “points of attach-
ment” approach, WIPO hoped it would facilitate not only the treaty 
negotiations, but also integration into the contracting parties’ do-
mestic legal systems.215 
c. Rights of Performers 
Performers secure six exclusive rights under the Phonogram 
Treaty:  moral rights,216 economic rights in their unfixed perform-
ances,217 the right to make fixed performances available,218 repro-
duction,219 distribution,220 and rental.221  Moral rights are the most 
controversial form of protection under copyright; the United States 
refuses to recognize them and they are excluded from the TRIPs 
Agreement’s incorporation of Berne’s substantive provisions.222  
Moral rights allow an author “to object to any distortion, mutila-
tion or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation 
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or repu-
tation.”223  The Phonogram Treaty grants performers this privilege 
for the first time, with respect to live aural and other fixed per-
formances.224 
Depending on the type of performance involved, performers 
possess varying means of exploiting their efforts.  For unfixed per-
formances, they may authorize the broadcast or communication of 
their performances, or choose to fix them in any form.225  These 
options expand similar rights already available under the Rome 
 
214. See id. art. 3(2)-(3); Rome Convention, supra note 25, arts. 4-7. 
215. See Basic Proposal—Phonogram, supra note 205, at n.3.08. 
216. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5. 
217. Id. art 6. 
218. Id. art 10. 
219. Id. art 7. 
220. Id. art 8. 
221. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art 9. 
222. Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, 
art. 9(1). 
223. Berne Convention, supra note 17, art. 6bis (1). 
224. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5(1).  As of yet, the United States has not 
established its official position on this provision. 
225. See id. art. 6.  The right to broadcast or communicate an unfixed performance 
does not extend to those which have already been broadcast.  See id. art. 6(i). 
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Convention and the TRIPs Agreement.226  Once a performance has 
been fixed, the performer can choose to make it available to the 
public “by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of 
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them.”227  This option allows performances to be trans-
mitted via satellite or over the Internet.228 
For performances fixed in phonographic form, performers gain 
a significantly broader right of reproduction than that existing un-
der the Rome Convention—unconditional and exclusive authority 
over direct or indirect reproduction in any form or manner.229  In 
addition, performers achieve for the first time the power to author-
ize the distribution and rental of performances fixed in phono-
grams.230  The contracting parties, however, retain the ability to 
define significant aspects of these rights in their domestic laws, 
such as the exhaustion of the right of distribution and the extent of 
the right of rental.231 
d. Rights of Producers 
Producers benefit from four exclusive rights concerning their 
phonograms:  reproduction,232 distribution,233 rental,234 and au-
thorization of public availability.235  Each of these rights mirrors 
its counterpart with regard to performers, except for mutatis mu-
tandis changes.  Of the four, only the rights of distribution and 
making phonograms available to the public are new.  Article 11 on 
 
226. The Rome Convention gives performers the right to prevent the broadcast or 
communication of their unfixed performances without their consent.  See Rome Conven-
tion, supra note 25, art. 7(1)(a).  The TRIPs Agreement extends to performers the right of 
fixation in phonographic form only.  See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 14(1). 
227. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 10. 
228. See id. 
229. See id. art. 7.  The Rome Convention previously granted “the possibility of 
preventing” reproduction without their consent.  Rome Convention, supra note 25, art. 
7(1)(c). 
230. See Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 8, 9. 
231. See id.  A grandfather clause also exists for equitable remuneration systems 
dealing with the right of rental.  See id. art. 9(2). 
232. See id. art. 11. 
233. See id. art. 12. 
234. See id. art. 13. 
235. See id. art. 14. 
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reproduction broadens the authority already granted to producers 
in the Rome Convention by including the language “in any manner 
or form.”236  This phrase encapsulates all technological means of 
reproduction, including digitization and downloading from com-
puters.237  Article 13, concerning rental, provides a similar right to 
that under TRIPs Agreement article 14(4), including an exemption 
for pre-existing equitable remuneration systems.238  The cumula-
tive effect of these provisions is to raise producers up to the same 
level of protection as authors under the Berne Convention. 
e. Common Provisions 
Several provisions apply to performers and producers alike, in-
cluding some which duplicate features of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty.239  The articles dealing with limitations and exceptions, ob-
ligations concerning technological measures and rights manage-
ment information, application in time, and enforcement all imitate 
their WIPO Copyright Treaty counterparts.240  Some common pro-
visions, however, are unique to the Phonogram Treaty.  For exam-
ple, article 15 gives performers and producers the right to a single 
equitable remuneration for the direct or indirect use of commercial 
phonograms broadcast or communicated to the public.241  Al-
though the contracting parties retain the power to detail this right’s 
scope in national legislation, the delegates agreed to include within 
it phonograms made publicly available by wire or wireless 
means.242  Another difference in the Phonogram Treaty involves an 
 
236. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 11.  The Rome Convention allows for 
“the right to authorise or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phono-
grams.”  Rome Convention, supra note 25, art. 10. 
237. See Basic Proposal—Phonogram, supra note 205, at n.14.06. 
238. Compare Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 13 (providing an exemption for 
pre-existing remuneration systems), with TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 14(4) 
(same). 
239. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1. 
240. Compare Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 16, 18, 19, 22, 23 (imitating 
the provisions found in the WIPO Copyright Treaty), with WIPO Copyright Treaty, su-
pra note 1, arts. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 (serving as the basis for many provisions in the Pho-
nogram Treaty). 
241. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 15. 
242. See id. art. 15(2), (4).  The contracting parties may also choose to limit, or not 
apply at all, the right of remuneration.  This is the only means by which a party may 
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acknowledgment of the change in the term of protection from 
twenty years under the Rome Convention to fifty years under the 
TRIPs Agreement.243  Finally, the delegates agreed to prohibit the 
imposition of any formalities in conjunction with the enjoyment or 
exercise of rights garnered under the Phonogram Treaty.244 
III. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 
Even though negotiations have ended, the real debate over 
WIPO’s Internet Treaties is about to commence, as the signatories 
begin to ratify the treaties.  This part examines the major domestic 
obstacles to implementation in the United States.  Apart from do-
mestic concerns, significant questions linger with respect to the 
Internet Treaties themselves.  Accordingly, this part examines the 
application of a minimum standards-type agreement to the Internet.  
Related concerns involve the substantial disability caused by the 
lack of any effective enforcement or dispute resolution provisions 
in the treaties and whether the WTO can integrate these treaties 
into the TRIPs Agreement. 
A. United States Ratification 
The Internet Treaties possess an integral place in the Clinton 
Administration’s “Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” 
based on the hope that they “will greatly facilitate the commercial 
applications of on-line digital communications.”245  Despite this 
enthusiasm for the treaties, ratification in the United States is not 
proving to be as easy as the Clinton Administration would like.  
Many members of Congress, including Senator Hatch, have ex-
pressed concern “that the final language of these agreements may 
reflect decisions on . . . unresolved [domestic] issues that may 
jeopardize Senate ratification.”246  In fact, very few changes are 
 
make a reservation to the Phonogram Treaty.  See id. arts. 15(3), 21. 
243. Id. art. 17; Rome Convention, supra note 25, art. 14; TRIPs Agreement, supra 
note 2, art. 14(5). 
244. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, art. 20. 
245. Mark Felsenthal & Angela Drolte, Administration Outlines Objectives for 
Global Internet Copyright Policy, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1179 (July 9, 
1997). 
246. Hatch Urges PTO Not to Lock U.S. in Berne Pact to Terms Still Disputed at 
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required in order to make the treaties operative because copyright 
enjoys a broad interpretation under United States law.  Instead, 
three main issues have taken center stage during Congressional 
hearings, only one of which deals with a change explicitly man-
dated by the treaties:  (1) circumvention technology, (2) infringe-
ment liability, and (3) fair use. 
1. Circumvention Technology 
Current United States law fails to address the issue of circum-
vention technologies, which are used to “prevent unauthorized ac-
cess to copyrighted works and to provide copyright information 
about the work.”247  Two competing approaches have been intro-
duced, one by Representative Coble in House Bill 2281 (“Coble 
bill” or “Coble approach”),248 and another by Senator Hatch in 
Senate Bill 2037 (“Hatch bill” or “Hatch approach”).249 
The Coble bill proposes the addition of a new Chapter 12, 
“Copyright Protection and Management Systems,” to Title 17 of 
the United States Code.  The new chapter would prohibit the cir-
cumvention of copyright protection systems as well as the destruc-
tion of any copyright information.250  This amendment, which con-
tains civil and criminal penalties for violations, would make it 
illegal to manufacture, import, sell, or use any devise “primarily 
designed or produced for the purpose of circumvent[ion]” and any 
device that possesses “only [a] limited commercially significant 
 
Home, 13 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1449 (Sept. 18, 1996). 
247. Coble Introduces Measure to Implement WIPO Copyright Pacts, 14 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1366 (Aug. 6, 1997). 
248. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998).  A companion bill introduced by Representa-
tive Goodlatte, H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998), was amended and added to the original 
version of H.R. 2281.  Although H.R. 2281 initially dealt only with the implementation 
of the Internet Treaties, its amendment to include the key provisions of H.R. 3209 linked 
the U.S. ratification of the treaties to the resolution of internet service provider (“ISP”) 
liability issues. 
249. S. 2037, 105th Cong. (1998).  Another bill offered by Senator Ashcroft, S. 
1146, 105th Cong. (1997), was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which con-
ducted hearings in September 1997.  Debate in the Senate, however, focused on Senator 
Hatch’s proposal, which originally was presented as S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997). 
250. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong., tit. I 
(1998). 
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purpose or use other than . . . circumvent[ion].”251  Not unexpect-
edly, copyright holders support the Coble approach as a means of 
inhibiting piracy.  Many critics, however, object to its apparent 
conflict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.252 that manufacturing de-
vices capable of being used for copyright infringement is not itself 
an infringement.253 
While largely similar in form to its counterpart in the House of 
Representatives, Senator Hatch’s bill contains one important dis-
tinction with respect to circumvention technology.  It expressly ex-
empts reverse engineering “necessary to achieve interoperability of 
an independently created computer program with other programs,” 
provided, however, that (1) the necessary elements of such com-
puter program are not otherwise readily available and (2) the study 
and analysis of the computer programming does not constitute an 
act of copyright infringement.254  The ultimate choice of anti-
circumvention language undoubtedly will have a profound eco-
nomic impact on the computer and electronics industries. 
2. Infringement Liability 
Another significant economic and political issue centers 
around the liability of ISPs for the infringing acts of their custom-
ers.  ISP groups have lobbied vociferously for either a complete 
exemption or, at most, liability for their failure to remove infring-
ing materials of which they are aware.  Copyright holders fear that 
without greater ISP responsibility, piracy of digitized materials 
transmitted over the Internet will explode.  The software industry 
alone already loses twelve million dollars per year due to pi-
rates.255 
 
251. Id. 
252. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
253. See id.; Anti-Circumvention Prohibitions in Copyright Treaty Bill Draw Fire, 
14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1610 (Sept. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Anti-
Circumvention]. 
254. WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation 
Act of 1998, S. 2037, 105th Cong., tit. I § 103. 
255. See Senate Judiciary Panel Considers S 1146, Liability in Online Copyright 
Infringement, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1506 (Sept. 10, 1997) [hereinafter 
Senate Judiciary Panel]. 
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Both the Coble and Hatch bills strike a balance between the 
two camps.  Coble’s On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act256 would largely exempt ISPs from direct and con-
tributory infringement, as well as from vicarious liability for oth-
ers, for the intermediate storage and transmission of material 
through the ISP’s network under certain conditions.257  Senator 
Hatch varies his approach by requiring a qualifying ISP with 
knowledge or an awareness of infringing material to “expedi-
tiously . . . remove or disable access to the material” which is 
stored on the ISP’s system.258 
The issue of liability, although not addressed in the Internet 
Treaties, has nevertheless become inextricably intertwined in the 
United States implementation debate.  Given the enormous finan-
 
256. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong., tit. II (1998). 
257. Under Coble’s On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, ISPs 
are exempt from liability for direct infringement, and from monetary relief from con-
tributory infringement and vicarious liability, for the intermediate storage and transmis-
sion of material through their systems or networks if: 
(A) the transmission was initiated by another person; 
(B) the storage and transmission is carried out through an automatic techno-
logical process, without any selection of that material by the provider; and 
(C) no copy of the material thereby made by the provider is maintained on the 
provider’s system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other 
than the recipients anticipated by the person who initiated the transmission, and 
no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily 
accessible to such recipients for a longer period than is necessary for the 
transmission. 
Id. § 202(a).  An ISP also would be exempt from monetary relief for contributory in-
fringement or vicarious liability, based solely on the transmission or provision of access 
to material over its system or network, if the ISP: 
(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material is infringing or, in the ab-
sence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent; and 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, if the provider has the right and ability to control such activity. 
Id. 
258. Internet Copyright Infringement Liability Clarification Act of 1998, S. 2037, 
105th Cong., tit. II § 202.  This provision exempts ISPs from liability for monetary dam-
ages and, in certain circumstances, from injunctive and other equitable relief if (1) it did 
not have knowledge or an awareness of infringing materials or activities or (2) after ob-
taining such knowledge or awareness it acted expeditiously to remove or disable access 
to the materials.  See id.  This exemption also is premised upon the ISP not receiving a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, where the ISP had the 
right and ability to control such activity.  See id. 
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cial stake of ISPs in the world’s leading technology market, this is 
hardly surprising.  Certainly some limitation of liability needs to 
be adopted.  All that remains to be seen is whether a “notice and 
takedown” requirement will appear in the final draft.259 
3. Fair Use 
Congress also is discussing the explicit language expanding the 
existing fair use exemption.  Fair use is a defense to infringement 
for “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing, . . . scholarship, or research.”260  Educators, other scholars, 
and technology manufacturers believe this principle needs to be 
updated in light of the anti-circumvention provisions contained in 
both the House and Senate bills.261  Copyright holders, wishing to 
protect their property, object to any such language out of a fear 
that infringers might manipulate it to their advantage.  Both the 
Coble and Hatch bills have contemplated various forms of fair use 
language, making its inclusion very likely in the bills’ final drafts. 
The significant debate over this issue in both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives relates back to some of the criticisms 
leveled at the treaties during the Diplomatic Conference for their 
failure to address this issue.262  Indeed, in countries without a 
broad exemption resembling that of the United States, ratification 
of the treaties without any corresponding legislation ensuring fair 
use could stifle innovative and educational applications of the In-
ternet. 
Despite these controversial matters, which have occupied much 
of Congress’s time and lobbyists’ money, implementing legislation 
for the Internet Treaties eventually will win the approval of the 
legislative bodies and become part of United States law.263  For 
other countries, particularly code-based and developing countries 
 
259. Rep. Coble Urged to Drop Online Copyright Liability Issue, COMM. DAILY, 
Sept. 17, 1997. 
260. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
261. See Anti-Circumvention, supra note 253. 
262. See Basic Proposal—Phonogram, supra note 205. 
263. At the time of this Article’s publication, the House Commerce Committee was 
attempting to obtain jurisdiction over H.R. 2281, making the future of the Coble bill un-
clear. 
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with a minimalist approach to copyright protection, ratification 
will prove a much more daunting task.  It is this wide variation in 
national standards which raises another potential problem with the 
treaties and their practical application around the world. 
B. Minimum Standards and the Internet 
According to some observers, the Internet Treaties fell short of 
expectations based upon their very nature—a minimum standards, 
or minimum protections, type of agreement.264  Minimum stan-
dards treaties lay down the basic rights and duties of the contract-
ing parties without detailing how each state defines them in its 
domestic law.  International intellectual property conventions, in-
cluding the TRIPs Agreement, have always been minimum stan-
dards agreements, in large part because they represented the lowest 
common denominator between the disparate levels of protection in 
the contracting parties.  They set minimum standards by establish-
ing a bar under which no party may fall. 
This formula directly contrasts with other international re-
gimes, which attempt to create minimum standards through har-
monization and mutual recognition.  For example, in the WTO, the 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement and the Technical Barriers 
Agreement employ vague language to scrutinize national meas-
ures.265  Where international standards exist, they are used to 
evaluate the validity of the measure, but are not binding.266  These 
agreements try to build a minimum standard of protection from the 
ground up. 
In the case of the Internet Treaties, parts of both these ap-
proaches have been employed.  While the treaties set very definite 
rights, they serve as a bar to which most countries must reach up, 
rather than one which they cannot fall below.  This is because no 
consensus exists in dealing with protection of material transmitted 
 
264. See discussion supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (describing the na-
ture of a minimum standards agreement). 
265. See Technical Barriers Agreement, supra note 59, arts. 2.2, 3; Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, supra note 60, arts. 2.1, 5.6.  Examples include such language as 
“legitimate,” “necessary,” and “not more trade-restrictive than necessary.” 
266. See Technical Barriers Agreement, supra note 59, arts. 2.2, 3; Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, supra note 60, arts. 2.1, 5.6. 
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over the Internet and captured in other digital technologies.  Intel-
lectual property purists, like PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman, 
would dispute this observation by saying that traditional copyright 
principles automatically subsume this new medium, requiring only 
minor modifications in doctrine to accommodate its technological 
peculiarities.267 
Although this may be true in the United States, many code-
based legal systems have much more specific intellectual property 
laws, and will be forced to amend them in order to comply with the 
treaties.  Furthermore, the differences in both legal and functional 
standards between nations, which will exist under these treaties, 
inherently conflict with the sweeping, monolithic nature of the 
Internet.  The reality is that inequalities in domestic legislation 
could not only make enforcement of these treaties difficult, but 
also stifle the growth of the Internet as a means of commerce. 
As mentioned above, several matters, including the exhaustion 
of rights, infringement liability, and enforcement, were left to na-
tional legislatures to flesh out.  Other key concepts, like the place 
of publication and the definition of a “copy,” were ignored en-
tirely.  Although compromises must always be made in treaty ne-
gotiations in order to achieve some level of agreement, the combi-
nation of these inadequacies with the technological realities of the 
Internet could prove deadly to these treaties.  For example, copy-
right holders would have little incentive in placing protected mate-
rials on a web page if they had to constantly investigate the status 
of their rights under a hundred different legal systems. 
Once protected material appears on the Internet, it can be ac-
cessed from anywhere in the world, including countries not party 
to these new treaties.  In addition, the cost of litigating in numer-
ous legal systems, with often widely different standards, would 
also deter many intellectual property holders from participating in 
an electronic marketplace.  While different enforcement standards 
currently exist in dealing with traditional forms of intellectual 
property, tracing the infringement of intellectual property fixed in 
a good is comparatively simple, next to tracking down violators us-
ing the Internet.  The reality of information technology precludes 
 
267. See Lehman, supra note 82, at 13. 
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the ideological neatness of a minimum standards regime. 
Although these inadequacies suggest that more work needs to 
be done in an effort to harmonize national laws dealing with intel-
lectual property in a digital environment, this does not mean that 
these treaties do not represent an important first step along that 
path.  Indeed, the Director General of WIPO acknowledged the 
need for progress in his closing speech to the Diplomatic Confer-
ence’s delegates by saying, “[t]his Diplomatic Conference did not 
solve all the questions that await international norm making in the 
field of intellectual property . . . .  WIPO is expected to deal in the 
near future . . . with the specific copyright and trademark problems 
of global information systems, like the Internet.”268  WIPO must 
continue to act as an impetus to ensure that intellectual property 
protection adapts to rapid changes in technology in a way which 
promotes, rather than restricts, the development of an electronic 
marketplace. 
C. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement 
Another related concern with the WIPO Copyright and Phono-
gram Treaties involves their pointed rejection of the WTO’s dis-
pute settlement system and the TRIPs Agreement’s enforcement 
procedures.  At the time the TRIPs Agreement entered into force, it 
appeared that the seemingly endless “GATT v. WIPO” debate had 
resolved itself in a sort of marriage, with each institution comple-
menting the other with its best qualities.  The TRIPs Agreement 
intended to supplement the substance of existing intellectual prop-
erty law with a strong, trade-based sanction system.  As an analog, 
articles 41 through 61 were meant to provide guidance and a basic 
framework for enforcement on the national level.269  WIPO 
brought its intellectual property expertise and provided a conven-
ient forum for discussion and development.  Despite the best inten-
tions, demonstrated by the 1996 bilateral cooperation agree-
ment,270 the WTO-WIPO marriage is showing signs of strain. 
 
268. Closing Speech:  Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbor-
ing Rights Questions, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/INF.9 (Dec. 23, 1996) (visited Jan. 2, 
1998) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/inf9.htm>. 
269. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2. 
270. See WIPO/WTO Agreement, supra note 50. 
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Since 1995, the WTO has proven itself to be an accessible and 
capable option for the settlement of intellectual property disputes.  
WIPO has also demonstrated resiliency through its renewed efforts 
to update international standards.  A by-product of this resiliency, 
however, has been the renewal of discussions over a WIPO-based 
dispute resolution system.  In this context, the choice of the Dip-
lomatic Conference delegates to remain silent on dispute resolution 
and to reject the use of TRIPs-type enforcement provisions pre-
sents the WTO with a challenge:  Lead, follow, or get out of the 
way. 
Through its leadership of the coalition of nations, which 
blocked the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement’s enforcement pro-
visions, the United States stated its preference for domestic legisla-
tion or actual integration into the TRIPs Agreement.271  Despite its 
recent displeasure with WTO dispute settlement over the Helms-
Burton Act debate, the legal and economic benefits of intellectual 
property protection for the United States under this system cannot 
be denied.  This is particularly true considering the expansive na-
ture of the Internet, which effectively requires near-universal par-
ticipation, such as under the WTO, for the application of these 
treaties to be meaningful.  Should the WTO fail to assert itself, 
however, an opening would appear for WIPO to assume an inde-
pendent leadership role in the settlement of intellectual property 
disputes.  In sum, the success of the TRIPs Agreement’s “trade-
intellectual property” marriage depends on its adaptability and re-
sponsiveness. 
Until now, the WTO’s main interest in digital and information 
technology has come on the hardware side.  As a part of the 1996 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore, a discussion and eventual 
agreement on trade in information technology products comprised 
a significant part of the proceedings.  Although the liberalization 
of trade in this area will certainly promote access to the digital en-
vironment, that environment’s content is equally important to the 
development of an electronic marketplace.  The WTO, through the 
TRIPs Council, must assume its responsibility as an equal partner 
along with WIPO, in the creation of rules and norms by lending its 
 
271. See Greenstein I, supra note 185. 
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enforcement and dispute resolution facilities to new WIPO agree-
ments.  As a part of this initiative, the WTO should bring the 
WIPO Copyright and Phonogram Treaties under its auspices to 
help ensure universal application as soon as possible.  While dis-
cussion regarding a potential WIPO dispute resolution system con-
tinues, plans remain too nebulous for immediate application to 
these treaties.  But technological change will not be delayed by in-
stitutional inertia; the WTO should act now rather than later. 
D. Coverage by the TRIPs Agreement 
Apart from deciding if the WTO should integrate the WIPO 
Copyright and Phonogram Treaties under the TRIPs Agreement is 
the question of whether it can accomplish this goal.  Article 71(2) 
of the TRIPs Agreement governs the TRIPs Agreement’s amend-
ment procedures.272  Several problems present themselves when 
trying to apply article 71(2) to these treaties.  The first involves the 
language “merely serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels 
of protection.”273  An argument can be made that the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty does not “merely” raise the level of protection under 
Berne, but also broadens it by creating new rights and making 
some of Berne’s principles applicable to a new subject matter. 
Another article 71 problem concerns the fact that both new 
treaties create rights not previously in existence under current in-
ternational agreements.  For example, the right of public commu-
nication appears for the first time in both documents,274 and the 
Phonogram Treaty establishes moral rights and the power of distri-
bution.275  None of these provisions constitute “rights achieved, 
 
272. Article 71(2) provides in relevant part: 
Amendments merely serving the purpose of adjusting to higher levels of pro-
tection of intellectual property rights achieved, and in force, in other multilat-
eral agreements and accepted under those agreements by all Members of the 
WTO may be referred to the Ministerial Conference for action in accordance 
with paragraph 6 of Article X of the WTO Agreement on the basis of a consen-
sus proposal from the Council for TRIPs. 
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2. 
273. Id. 
274. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8; Phonogram Treaty, supra 
note 7, art. 14. 
275. Phonogram Treaty, supra note 7, arts. 5, 12. 
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and in force, in other multilateral agreements and accepted under 
those agreements.”276 
Finally, it is not clear what article 71 means by “all members of 
the WTO.”277  Questions remain whether this truly requires una-
nimity.  Questions also remain about those WTO members not 
party to the Berne, Paris, and Rome Conventions—whether they 
truly can “accept” amendments to those agreements.  This formula 
appears surprising considering the patchy success of the GATT 
amendment under article XXX, hobbled in large part by its una-
nimity and consensus requirements.278 
Given these potential problems under article 71(2), the ques-
tion is how could the WTO bring these treaties under the TRIPs 
Agreement.  Article 71(1) might provide a potential answer.  It re-
quires the TRIPs Council to review the TRIPs Agreement every 
two years and empowers it to “undertake reviews in the light of 
any relevant new developments which might warrant modification 
or amendment of this Agreement.”279  Under article X(1) of the 
WTO Agreement, the TRIPs Council can submit a proposal to the 
Ministerial Conference to amend the TRIPs Agreement under arti-
cle X(3).280  Although this amendment procedure carries with it 
more risk and difficulty than the abbreviated procedure under the 
TRIPs Agreement article 71(2), it may be a necessary step in order 
to achieve integration of the new treaties. 
To facilitate future amendments, the TRIPs Council could pro-
pose a modification of the TRIPs Agreement to authorize simpler 
procedures for the assumption of WIPO treaties.  Another route 
might be the conclusion of a multilateral agreement during a sub-
sequent negotiating round, which would take up the issue of devel-
oping technologies and intellectual property.  Although this too 
would prove a most difficult task, some step must be taken in order 
to ensure that the TRIPs Agreement and the WTO remain in stride 
with WIPO in the development and enforcement of international 
 
276. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 71(2). 
277. Id. 
278. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:  LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 51-52 (1991). 
279. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 71(1). 
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intellectual property standards in the digital age. 
CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, governments have had the luxury of creating 
long-standing legal norms after careful deliberation.  The rapidly 
changing pace of technology today confounds and challenges law-
yers to keep pace.  The Internet Treaties mark a promising and 
crucial turning point in the evolution of copyright law and the de-
velopment of the WTO-WIPO alliance. 
These treaties, however, are far from perfect.  Their minimum-
standards nature leaves several crucial matters unresolved:  en-
forcement, dispute settlement, ISP liability, fair use, exhaustion of 
rights, place of publication, and the definition of a copy.  Despite 
these inadequacies, the resulting Internet Treaties are not an exer-
cise in futility.  They establish an international consensus on the 
application of copyright and neighboring right principles to digital 
technologies which can serve as the foundation for further legal in-
frastructure down the line. 
As one of the first steps toward shaping a legal framework for 
the electronic marketplace, these Internet Treaties require near uni-
versal acceptance and participation in order to be truly effective.  
The only viable means for ensuring this kind of participation is to 
integrate the treaties into the TRIPs Agreement so that they can 
benefit from the disciplines of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.  Once this integration is achieved, WIPO can pro-
ceed to further develop international norms with a mind to ad-
dressing the remaining deficiencies.  For the future to reap the full 
commercial benefits of today’s technological advances, the WTO 
and WIPO must continue the collaborative successes epitomized 
by the WIPO Copyright and Phonogram Treaties, thereby fulfilling 
the promise of the TRIPs Agreement. 
